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We investigate the relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility. 
Proxying fathers’ earnings with using detailed occupational data, we find that sons who 
grew up in countries that were more unequal in the 1970s were less likely to have 
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  iiI. Introduction 
 
A common view among citizens of large industrialized countries is that economic 
inequality is fair, provided there are equal opportunities.
1 At the same time, there tends to 
be a belief that equal opportunity norms are violated when the degree of intergenerational 
mobility is low and family background exerts a strong influence on children’s income in 
adulthood. It is therefore reasonable to think that inequality may be more acceptable in a 
society with a high level of social mobility. 
 
Despite this important conceptual nexus between social mobility and inequality, the 
literatures on inequality and intergenerational mobility have largely developed in 
isolation from one another. That very little is known about the association between 
inequality and intergenerational mobility stands in contrast to the burgeoning literature on 
the consequences of inequality for variables such as economic growth, health and 
political behavior. To the extent that other studies have looked at the relationship between 
inequality and social mobility, the analysis has been descriptive, or focused around the 
question of ‘American exceptionalism’. We know of no previous study that has formally 
tested the hypothesis that there is a relationship between a country’s level of inequality 
and the degree of intergenerational mobility. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between inequality and intergenerational 
mobility is unclear. One possibility is that when inequality between parents increases, 
                                                 
1 In 1991, almost all adults in West Germany, Britain, and the United States, and a majority of adults in 
Japan, agreed with the statement “It’s fair if people have more money and wealth, but only if there are 
equal opportunities.” (Jencks and Tach 2006). intergenerational mobility will fall because it is easier for rich parents to buy their 
children educational advantages that less well-off parents cannot afford (Burtless and 
Jencks 2003). But as Solon (2004) argues, this effect will be undermined to the extent 
that children from less advantaged backgrounds disproportionately benefit from public 
programs.  
 
Another channel through which inequality might affect intergenerational mobility is via 
the demand for redistribution. In more unequal societies, the median voter will tend to lie 
further below the mean income and may have a stronger preference for redistribution 
(Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Conversely, if higher inequality increases the political 
influence of the wealthy – perhaps through campaign finance contributions – then the 
scope for government to institute progressive policies may narrow (Burtless and 
Jencks 2003). Finally, higher inequality might reduce intergenerational mobility to the 
extent that it leads to segregation along income lines, resulting in adverse peer effects for 
children from low-income families (Durlauf 1996).  
 
II. Estimating Intergenerational Mobility 
A major obstacle to systematic empirical research into the link between inequality and 
intergenerational mobility is the lack of suitable data. The ideal dataset to address this 
question would have two main features. First, it would be comparable such that cross-
country differences in estimated mobility are meaningful and do not derive from 
differences in data construction across countries. Second, it would contain panel data on 
  2the incomes of fathers and sons at economically active ages. The 1999 Social Inequality 
III module of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) – which we utilize in this 
paper – scores highly on the first criteria to the extent that it contains information, 
collected on a consistent basis, for individuals from a large number of countries. 
However, this is partly offset by the fact that the ISSP does not explicitly contain data on 
parental earnings. We therefore follow a spate of previous studies (eg, Bjorklund and 
Jantti 1997; Grawe 2001; Leigh 2007), in using predicted parental earnings as a proxy for 
actual parental earnings. 
 
Our empirical strategy involves a three-step estimation procedure, using data on men 
aged 25-54 in the 1999 ISSP. First, for each of the 16 countries where data on fathers’ 
occupation is available, we regress the relationship between log hourly wages yij  of 
individual  i in occupation j on a vector of dummies for each occupation Xij, and a 
quadratic in age Ai: 
 
ij i i ij j ij A A X y ε θ + + + =
2 '          ( 1 )  
 
Second, the earnings of fathers in occupation j are then predicted to be the same as those 
of a 40 year old in occupation j. Algebraically, where A=40, j j f y y ˆ ˆ = = .  
 
Third, we estimate the relationship between sons’ actual log hourly wages and fathers’ 
predicted log hourly wages. 
 
  3i i i j f si A A y y ε β α + + + + = =
2 ˆ        ( 2 )  
 
These three steps are performed separately for each country in the sample. 
 
The coefficient β in equation (2) denotes the intergenerational elasticity (IGE), being the 
percentage change in the son’s earnings for doubling of the father’s earnings. Another 
common measure of intergenerational mobility is ρ, the intergenerational correlation 
(IGC) which is based on estimating the same regression, but with the variance in earnings 
held constant between the two periods. The relationship between the two measures is a 






β ρ =            ( 3 )  
 
In this paper, we focus primarily on the IGC because the above approach, which imputes 
fathers’ earnings with fathers’ occupations, compresses the variance of fathers’ earnings, 
which in turn inflates our estimates of the IGE. However, we also test the robustness of 
our results to using the IGE. Estimates of the IGE and IGC for each country are listed in 
Table A1. 
 
Among employed fathers and sons, three factors drive intergenerational mobility: (i) sons 
working in different occupations from their fathers (inter-occupational mobility); (ii) sons 
working in the same occupation but with lower or higher earnings than their fathers 
  4(intra-occupational mobility); and (iii) changes in the average earnings of occupations 
over time. The method employed here will capture inter-occupational mobility (factor i), 
but will only capture part of intra-occupational mobility (factor ii), since fathers in the 
same occupation are assigned the same wage. Moreover, this approach will not take 
account of changes in the average earnings of occupations over time (factor iii). To gauge 
the likely importance of this issue, we use microdata from US Censuses to calculate the 
mean age-adjusted log earnings of men aged 25-54 in 192 occupations. The correlation 
between an occupation's mean earnings in 1970 and 2000 was 0.71. While this 
correlation is reassuringly high, there is still a possibility that our approach will mis-
estimate the true level of intergenerational mobility. 
 
To help validate our estimates, we calculated the correlation between our estimated levels 
of intergenerational mobility and those published elsewhere. With three common 
countries, the correlation between our IGCs and those of Jäntti et al (2006) is 0.70. With 
four common countries, the correlation between our IGEs and those of Solon (2002) is 
0.77.  
 
III. Inequality and Social Mobility 
To measure income inequality, we use the Gini coefficient: a measure of the income gap 
between two randomly selected individuals in the population. Where possible, we utilize 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) -- probably the most reliable source for cross-
country estimates of income inequality (Atkinson 2004). For the four countries in our 
sample that do not participate in the LIS, we use the highest quality estimate from the 
  5Deininger and Squire (1996) database. We use the closest estimate to the year 1975 – the 
likely period when the parents in the sample were making decisions about investments in 
their children’s human capital (the sons in our sample were aged 25-54 in 1999, so they 
were aged 1-30 in 1975). For Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Spain, LIS estimates of income inequality are only available for the 1980s and 1990s, 
though estimates for the early 1970s are available in the Deininger-Squire database. For 
these countries, a tradeoff exists between using the most appropriate time period and the 
highest-quality inequality estimates. As such, we also conduct our analysis using data 
sourced solely from each dataset. 
 
The relationship between inequality and intergenerational mobility for all 16 countries in 
our sample is depicted in Figure 1. While a positive relationship between inequality and 
intergenerational mobility is discernible, this is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. However, for the six former Warsaw Pact countries in our sample, 
which were not market economies in the 1970s, it may be unreasonable to draw a link 
between inequality in the 1970s and intergenerational mobility between the 1970s and 
late 1990s. (Recall that the theoretical explanations suggesting a relationship between 
inequality and social mobility include private expenditure on education, political 
donations, and median voter models. These are more likely to apply in capitalist 
democracies than in Communist countries.) 
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.2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45
Gini circa 1975
ρ =-0.01+0.70*Gini (t = 1.57)      R
2=0.22  
 
As such, Figure 2 excludes the six former Warsaw Pact countries. The coefficient on 
inequality becomes statistically significant at the one per cent level and the magnitude of 
the coefficient almost doubles. In addition, the R
2 rises to 0.71. To account for the 
possibility that these statistical results are gaining leverage from the inclusion of Chile, 
we excluded this country from the sample and re-estimated the model. Even when we 
dropped Chile, however, the Gini coefficient was significant at the 6 per cent level.  
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.2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45
Gini circa 1975
 
ρ =-0.19+1.32*Gini (t = 12.01)      R
2=0.77 (excl. Warsaw Pact) 
ρ =-0.19+1.30*Gini (t = 2.87)      R
2=0.52 (excl. Warsaw Pact and Chile) 
 
We performed a series of robustness checks to confirm these results. First, we re-
estimated our results using Gini coefficients sourced exclusively from the Deininger-
Squire database, which contains inequality measures of lower quality but of the 
appropriate vintage (the database has pre-1980 inequality measures for all but two 
countries, Russia and Latvia). Second, we used only Gini coefficients from the LIS 
database, whose estimates are generally regarded as higher quality, but are not 
necessarily derived from surveys in the 1970s. Third, we re-specified the dependent 
variable to the IGE instead of the IGC. Fourth, we added controls for the rate of return to 
education in the 1970s, and the log of GDP per capita in 1975 (sources for these variables 
  8are described in the Data Appendix). In each of these robustness checks, and in 
combinations of them, the results are very close to those above, both in magnitude and 
statistical significance. The only exception is that when we use solely LIS inequality 
estimates, the coefficient on the IGC/IGE is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. By contrast, when we use Gini coefficients sourced exclusively from the 
Deininger-Squire database, the relationship between inequality and the IGC/IGE is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, even including the former Warsaw Pact countries.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Using cross-country data, we find that sons who grew up in more unequal countries in the 
1970s were less likely to have experienced social mobility by 1999. Across countries, our 
estimates suggest that a 10-point rise in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 0.07-0.13 
increase in the intergenerational earnings correlation. Moving from rags to riches is 
harder in more unequal countries.  
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  10Data Appendix 
 
Intergenerational correlations and elasticities: Estimated using data on men aged 25-
54 from the 1999 Social Inequality III module from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP). The survey covers both West Germany and East Germany (since 
four-fifths of the population of Germany lives in what was formerly West Germany, our 
estimate of the level of intergenerational mobility in Germany should be close to the true 
level in West Germany). See text for details on how the IGCs and IGEs are derived. 
Hourly wages are estimated as annual earnings divided by (weekly hours multiplied by 
52). The earnings question was asked consistently within each country, but the treatment 
of deductions and taxation varied. Occupations in the ISSP are coded based on the four 
digit 1988 ISCO/ILO occupation coding scheme. 
 
Gini coefficients: Graphs and regressions shown in the paper are based upon LIS Gini 
coefficients where available, and Deininger-Squire Gini coefficients otherwise. We use 
the gini coefficient in preference to other measures of inequality since it is more readily 
available for earlier years. Although the LIS dataset contains measures such as the 90/10 
and the Atkinson index, these inequality measures are not available in the Deininger-
Squire database. 
 
LIS Gini coefficients: Sourced from the Luxembourg Income Study Key Figures, 
accessed at http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm on January 11, 2007. We 
used the year closest to 1975. 
 
Deininger-Squire Gini coefficients: Sourced from the World Income Inequality 
Database, version 2.0a (June 2005), available at http://econ.worldbank.org. We only 
choose estimates that were labeled as quality=”accept” in the Deininger-Squire database. 
However, the Gini coefficient for Cyprus is based on a survey of less than national 
coverage (quality=”nn”). For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we use the Gini 
coefficient for Czechoslovakia. For Russia, we use the Gini coefficient for the USSR. For 
all countries, the gini was calculated as close as possible to 1975. 
 
Rate of return to education: Sourced from Table 1 in Psacharopoulos (1981). We use 
the estimate closest to 1975. Estimates show the private rate of return to attaining higher 
education, relative to secondary education. We use this estimate on the basis that it is 
available for the maximum number of countries in our sample. Other rates of return, such 
as the increase in log earnings associated with an additional year of schooling, are only 
available for a smaller number of countries in Psacharopoulos's survey. 
Although attaining higher education was relatively uncommon in the 1970s for young 
people in most countries, we regard the returns to higher education as a proxy for the 
returns across all types of education.  Across countries, Psacharopoulos's results show a 
high correlation between the returns to education at different levels. No adjustment is 
made for ability bias. 
 
Average GDP per capita in 1975: Measured in 1990 US dollars per capita, sourced 
from Maddison (2003). For the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we use the GDP for 
  11Czechoslovakia.  For Russia and Latvia, we use the GDP for the USSR. For Cyprus, we 
use the GDP for Greece. 
  12Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Parentheses contain standard errors for mobility estimates or year of estimate otherwise  
  Intergenerational 
Income Mobility in 
1999 







Capita in 1975 
  Correlation Elasticity  LIS  Deininger-
Squire  
Per cent  US$ (PPP 
method) 
Australia  0.215    
(0.066) 




0.343      
(1976) 
13.9        
(1969) 
13170 
Canada  0.110    
(0.067) 




0.316      
(1975) 
19.7        
(1961) 
14316 
Chile  0.414    
(0.071) 
0.571     
(0.098) 
--  0.46        
(1971) 
-- 4323 
Cyprus  0.053    
(0.066) 
0.087     
(0.109) 
--  0.256       
(1966) 
14.8        
(1975) 
7722 
Czech Republic  0.132    
(0.057) 




0.207      
(1976) 
-- 7399   
Germany  
(West) 
0.121    
(0.095) 




0.306      
(1973) 
4.6         
(1964) 
12041 
Hungary  0.158    
(0.101)  




0.215      
(1977) 
-- 5805 
Latvia  0.222    
(0.079) 
0.278     
(0.099) 
--  0.270       
(1993) 
-- 6135 
New Zealand  0.191    
(0.083) 
0.245     
(0.107) 
--  0.300       
(1975) 
14.7        
(1966) 
12489 
Norway  0.145    
(0.048) 




0.373      
(1976) 
7.7         
(1966) 
12180 
Poland  0.365    
(0.084) 




0.258      
(1976) 
-- 5808 
Russia  0.045    
(0.069) 




0.246      
(1980) 
-- 6135   
Slovakia  0.156    
(0.073) 




0.207      
(1976) 
-- 7399   
Spain  0.335    
(0.101) 




0.371      
(1973) 
15.5        
(1971) 
8346 
Sweden  0.086    
(0.077) 




0.273      
(1975) 
10.3        
(1967) 
14183 
United States  0.167    
(0.093) 




0.344      
(1975) 





0.182    
(0.077) 
0.246     
(0.105) 
0.272 0.297  12.2  9608 
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